Abstract: Complex interactions can be found among three stakeholders—the government, land transferees (new agricultural operators), and smallholder farmers—within the framework of the well-facilitated farmland (high-standard farmland) construction in China. This study aims to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the farmland transfer and the underlying mechanism. The economic-agronomic influencing variables were determined in the process of the land consolidation and scaled operations. A tripartite evolutionary game model was grounded in the theory of bounded rationality. The government was served as a policy initiator for the socio-economic benefits, smallholders as the land suppliers weighing transfer rents against farming income, and the transferees as the scale-seeking entities evaluating costs, subsidies, and risks. A case study was carried out in the Xing’an League of Inner Mongolia, which was a pioneering region for the county-wide high-standard farmland construction. The field data was also incorporated the parameters, such as the per-mu construction investment, maintenance costs, grain prices, yield increments, transfer rents, and subsidy levels. Two primary construction modes were simulated: the conventional direct government investment model, where the state was fully funded the project, and the build-first-subsidize-later model, where the eligible operators were invested the upfront, and reimbursed the post-construction upon approval. Numerical simulations were also conducted using Matlab platform. The dynamic evolutionary paths were visualized for the three parties' strategy choices over time. The simulation results showed that: 1) Both policy models were steered the system toward an ideal equilibrium (1,1,1), where the government was promoted the construction, smallholders were transferred the land, and the transferees accepted. However, the build-first-subsidize-later model was induced a significantly high convergence rate, compared with the direct investment. Reputation incentives were further accelerated this process. If the post-construction subsidy was set too low, it also triggered a strategic shift among transferees toward non-acceptance, indicating the sensitivity of this model to financial adequacy. 2) Differentiated variables shared the non-linear influences on the evolutionary trajectory. Positive drivers—including the longer land transfer lease terms, higher grain yields, and increased market prices—were accelerated the convergence. Negative inhibitors—such as the rising farmland maintenance costs, transfer transaction costs, and higher crop production inputs—slowed down the evolution. Critical regulatory factors, like the per-mu construction investment, land transfer rent, and scale-operation subsidies, exhibited an inverted U-shaped impact; An optimal threshold was obtained beyond which the marginal benefits declined and even reversed the trend, due to the excessive the fiscal burden or diminished returns. Furthermore, a risk preference coefficient revealed that the entities with the higher risk tolerance and greater expected utility were more predisposed to engage in the build-first-subsidize-later scheme. 3) There was the significant divergence between paddy fields and drylands. In paddy field, the build-first-subsidize-later model was achieved in the highest tripartite co-evolution, due likely to the higher and more stable returns on the irrigation infrastructure investment. The transferees shared the greater self-funding pressure in dryland; Thus, the subsidies or complementary were sustained on their participation for the effective scaling. A multifaceted framework was promoted on the institutional refinement of the build-first-subsidize-later model, particularly its application in the high-return paddy field. Decision making was also calibrated on the thresholds of the critical variables to remain the returns. Regionally differentiated strategies can be expected for the financial and technical support in the dryland areas and economically lagging regions. Effective models were consolidated in the grain-producing zones. Finally, the legal safeguards were strengthened to formalize the land transfer platforms. Multi-stakeholder coordination can reduce the transaction costs and risks in the sustainable alignment of the well-facilitated farmland construction with the orderly land transfer in modern agriculture.