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小水电集约化运维管理三方演化博弈研究

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research on Small Hydropower Intensive Operation and Maintenance Management

  • 摘要: “双碳”背景下,为推进小水电集约化运维管理,保证其高质量发展。基于演化博弈理论,构建小水电业主、政府与运维服务企业之间的三方博弈模型,并运用Matlab软件进行数值仿真分析,以探究小水电集约化运维管理三方策略选择的演化路径。结果表明:初始策略的变化对博弈三方演化收敛速度有显著影响;在一定条件下,博弈系统将演化稳定于较理想的均衡状态(1,0,1);运维成本效益、政府奖惩力度、运维平台智慧度和方案收费系数是影响小水电实现集约化运维管理的主要因素。研究结论可为小水电业主参与集约化运维管理和政府制定相关政策提供一定的理论指导。

     

    Abstract: Under the background of “dual carbon”, in order to promote the intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower and ensure its high-quality development, this paper constructs a tripartite game model among small hydropower owners, governments and operation and maintenance service enterprises, based on the evolutionary game theory. And Matlab software are used for numerical simulation analysis to explore the evolutionary path of tripartite strategy selection for intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower. The results show that: the change of initial strategy has significant influence on the convergence speed of the tripartite evolution; under certain conditions, the game system will evolve stably in an ideal equilibrium state(1,0,1); The main factors affecting the implementation of intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower are cost efficiency, government reward and punishment, intelligence degree of operation and maintenance platform and scheme charge coefficient. The research conclusions can provide certain theoretical guidance for small hydropower owners to participate in intensive operation and maintenance management and for the government to formulate relevant policies.

     

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