Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research on Small Hydropower Intensive Operation and Maintenance Management

JIANG Xin; QIU Guo-kun; YANG Shang-qu; CHEN Jing; ZHAO Li; ZHANG Teng-fei

China Rural Water and Hydropower > 2024 > (8): 200-207.

JIANG Xin, QIU Guo-kun, YANG Shang-qu, CHEN Jing, ZHAO Li, ZHANG Teng-fei. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research on Small Hydropower Intensive Operation and Maintenance Management[J]. China Rural Water and Hydropower, 2024, (8): 200-207.

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research on Small Hydropower Intensive Operation and Maintenance Management

1. College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University;
2. Power China Chengdu Engineering Corporation Limited

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Received Date: January 04, 2024

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Abstract

Abstract

Under the background of “dual carbon”, in order to promote the intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower and ensure its high-quality development, this paper constructs a tripartite game model among small hydropower owners, governments and operation and maintenance service enterprises, based on the evolutionary game theory. And Matlab software are used for numerical simulation analysis to explore the evolutionary path of tripartite strategy selection for intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower. The results show that: the change of initial strategy has significant influence on the convergence speed of the tripartite evolution; under certain conditions, the game system will evolve stably in an ideal equilibrium state（1,0,1）; The main factors affecting the implementation of intensive operation and maintenance management of small hydropower are cost efficiency, government reward and punishment, intelligence degree of operation and maintenance platform and scheme charge coefficient. The research conclusions can provide certain theoretical guidance for small hydropower owners to participate in intensive operation and maintenance management and for the government to formulate relevant policies.

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References (15)

References

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